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**Interview of Former Special Agent of the FBI
Patrick J. Mullany (1966-1986)
by Michael M. O'Brien
August 29, 2005**

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Michael O'Brien: Today's date is August 29, 2005. My name is Michael O'Brien representing the Society of Special Agents of the FBI, and this is an FBI Oral History interview of Patrick Mullany at Indian Wells, California.

I'm with Patrick Mullany and Patrick is going to read the copyright release.

Patrick Mullany: We, the undersigned, convey the rights to the intellectual content of our interview on this date to the Society of the Former Special Agents of the FBI. The transfer is in exchange for the Society's efforts to preserve the historical legacy of the FBI and its members. We understand that portions of this interview may be deleted for security purposes. Unless otherwise restricted, we agree that acceptable sections can be published on the worldwide web and the recordings transferred to an established repository for preservation and research.

MO: And you will sign the forms and agree?

PM: Yes.

MO: And I have signed the form and so we're all set. Okay, let me ask you a few basic questions here Patrick. Your year of birth?

PM: March 18, 1935.

MO: Okay; your birthplace?

PM: New York, New York.

MO: Okay. And your FBI service dates?

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PM: After graduation from high school, I entered the organization within the Catholic Church called The Christian Brothers. During that period, I was able to get a Bachelors Degree in American History with a minor in British History. That was from Catholic University in Washington, DC. Then while teaching in New York as a Christian Brother, I obtained a Master's Degree in Counseling and Psychology from Manhattan College in New York.

And then after my time in New York, I wound up making a decision to leave the Christian Brothers. I left the Christian Brothers in 1965 and pursued a couple of minor jobs. Probably the worst job in my life was selling insurance for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and it was that that compelled me to take a serious look at the FBI.

I had family contact with the FBI. My sister had been a clerk in New York since the late 40's, early 50's, as a FBI person. She married Nicholas Dunbar. Nicholas was a Georgian, and got his fame so to speak in the FBI through the Boston Brinks Case. He was an FBI Agent and ended up in Washington, DC as a bank robbery supervisor and subsequently left the FBI. But it was through encouragement from them and other people that I had known. I had talked to young men in school, in grammar school, one in particular a fellow by the name of Dobbins, where his father was a special employee in the New York Office. He alerted me one day, and this was in the mid-60's, that the FBI was hiring. He said he thought it would be a great idea if I went down and put in an application.

I went down, I'll never forget, the day after Thanksgiving in 1965 and put in my application, and then I had my actual letter of appointment in hand before the end of that year, from Thanksgiving just through Christmas. The letter was to report for duty on the 31st of January of 1966.

An interesting day that I reported because they had record snow storms in Washington. I got into Washington about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, called in to the Training Division, and the nice young lady over at Training, she said, "If you hurry up right over here, we can give you credit for the entire day." So, I got credit for the entire day and had an EOD that beat probably 50% of my class by one day. So that was very significant.

MO: How old were you?

PM: At that time I was 29 years of age. Once I got assigned Special Agent and went through the training, I probably, like many New Yorkers, had a great deal of difficulty in firearms. I anticipated every shot that I ever took in training school.

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PM: Then eventually it wasn't until my first office in Jacksonville, Florida, that I actually learned the concept of shooting. There were people like Ed Bartel and Bill Kittle, and a couple of other fellows that really leaned on us pretty heavily. Because in those days the Field Offices took quite seriously the J. Edgar Hoover Shoot. So, clearly, if I shot the way I was shooting in training school, it would have been a very negative blow to the Jacksonville Division and they weren't going to let that happen.

Jacksonville, we spent 16 months there. The reason why I extended, because as you can well remember your first office was normally 12 months and nothing beyond that. But we had good news that my wife was expecting and they allowed us to stay until she had three months after child birth behind her. Then they gave us a very short transfer from Jacksonville all the way to Los Angeles, California.

I still to this day wonder how the Training Division or the Transfer/Administrative Division used to figure out where to put people. But clearly I think I defied everything, coming from New York, first assigned to Jacksonville, Florida, and then clear across the United States to Los Angeles, but it was a great transfer.

When I was in Los Angeles, the Training Division started to make rumbles of an interest in me because of the fact that I had a background in teaching. I had an advanced degree in psychology and they were looking to establish a faculty. I got a call from [Jack] Kirsch out of the FBI Academy, and he asked if I had any interest at all in becoming involved in the faculty. Of course, as a young Agent you never said no to anything. You said "yes, I do," and he came up with the scheme that the best way to get me in the zone, so to speak of the FBI Academy [tape fades] ... Rapidly, almost as soon as the papers hit the Transfer Unit, they said, "Wow, we got a guy who's actually asking to go New York, so he's going."

So, I will never forget I arrived in New York. I drove across the country in a Mercury Montclair as it was called at the time. I had two very young children and our last stop before getting into New York City was Breezewood, Pennsylvania, and it was 17 degrees below zero in Breezewood, Pennsylvania. I had to get my car jump-started that morning to make the trip all the way into New York City.

I arrived in New York and the welcome mat was out for me. There was great expectation in the New York Office that this upcoming genius, who was going to be assigned to the Academy, was coming. As I got into the New York Office the first day, I was presented with 67 cases. I told Joe Ponder, actually I told my SAC who at that time was Joe...oh, I can't think of it...a small guy with...I'll think of his name in a minute.

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PM: But I told him I said I'm in a bit of a dilemma, I've been assigned 67 cases and at the same time the Training Division is expecting that I start a Doctoral Program. So he said to me, "Well, you gotta go see Joe Ponder, the Administrative SAC."

Joe Ponder looked at me like I had a hole in the head, that I was coming into him and when he needed Agents to investigate what was going on then. [It] was the Vietnam War period, tremendous demonstrations on the street.

So, I clearly remember, in my California light suit, being assigned, and only because I was brand new to the office, as liaison with the New York City Police Department when the West 11th Street Penthouse bombing came down. Fortunately, I was from New York so I had enough sense to stand in the corner, keep your mouth shut, don't ask too many questions but keep your eyes open. I'll never forget the morning when the big scoop that was clearing up the bomb site came up with the finger of Diane Bongy [phonetic], and I was able to get that information to the office immediately. Chief Seidman [phonetic] with the New York City Police was a little upset that that information was transmitted as rapidly as it was to the New York Office.

That was my initial experience. It was 3 degrees, by the way, above zero. The temperature had really picked up, and it was the beginning of an interesting experience because my years in New York were full of activity. I was totally unable to get on track for any sort of a doctorate degree out of Columbia, but I was, on weekends that were free to me, able to pick up some extra graduate work in psychology. I was able to do that through Manhattan College. But the days in New York, and the days on Squad 42, basically covering the New Left were exciting, they were thrilling, they were full of adventure.

I was down on Wall Street when the hardhat-ers came marching on Wall Street. This was after they had lowered the flags in honor of the students that were killed in Kent State, and the hardhats didn't appreciate that. They came upon Wall Street and came from City Hall with one intent, and that was to raise that flag back up to full mast, and students went running everywhere. I'll never forget – running right through the glass windows at Pace College and it was a pretty ugly sight. But, in a way, it was a kind of a proud sight when the hardhat-ers got involved and really showed patriotism, when quite honestly, the only thing we were seeing on the streets of New York were the New Left, the people who were cursing America, the people who were not fighting in the war, and the people who were holding our country in disgrace.

PM: I was assigned a case that recently came back from memory. The case was called the Veterans Against the War in Vietnam. When I got assigned that case, I said to myself, "What can an Agent in New York City do in a case like this?" But it was a fascinating case and, of course, I couldn't help but think of it in the last Presidential election, because I did have the opportunity to observe some of the behavior of John Kerry during that period of time, and not taking anything away from his war service, I think what he did when he came back home was somewhat despicable.

There was a case, we had pretty good informant coverage, about the [people] going to Hanoi, North Vietnam, sitting down with the enemy. And I happened to wind up getting the phone call one morning. The phone call said, "Listen. They have a plane coming in with a 1001 letters from the prisoners of war." At that point, the military in the United States never knew who the prisoners of war were. They knew the missing in action, but didn't know who the prisoners of war actually were. And, sure enough, they had a catalogue listing of every single one of the prisoners of war. What they were intending to do was to take these letters and, kind of in an extortionate way, wave them in front of the relatives of the POW's and demand that they speak out against the war, speak out against America's role in the war and then they would get the letter. That was a very, very despicable thing. But that came out of the case, that quite honestly, is still with us in many ways, because I think that mentality that was back then is not dead yet; it's still alive and we're starting to see it repeat.

But New York was a great assignment. It was a fascinating assignment, but then after being there for about two years, I got assigned to the FBI Academy which was an adventure all in itself. I was the very first FBI faculty member to be on ground at the beginning of the new Academy.

MO: What year is this?

PM: This would have been 1974. Because I had been going back and forth teaching at the National Academy (the premier training program for law enforcement officials throughout the country and some of the allies as well), but the actual Academy opened in 1974. And at that time assigned at the same time was John Glover, John, of course, went to the Firearms Division. Some of the early things we did there...for the opening of the new Academy, we were carrying furniture from the old Academy, bringing it out to the new Academy. We wound up making beds getting ready for the first National Academy class to come in there. We wound up cleaning toilets and cleaning up the sinks and everything like that. Some of us came down with maybe large egos, but they were certainly leveled very, very early when we were assigned. But it was an effort to do everything that you had to do to get the place ready and have it respectable looking when it opened.

PM: A lot of things in the early days were questionable. They hadn't gone through the final checkout, the elevators weren't reliable, the guys had to hoof it up the stairs. There were certain things that might have been missing out of the bedroom areas, and whether they would be cabinets in the sink areas or what, but we opened up the Academy. The very first session I believe was the 90th Session, it might have been the 91st Session, but I believe it was the 90th Session. We had the whole full group of them come in there. I wound up teaching with a fellow very, very closely and became very close friends, Howard Teten, and out of that relationship many, many things happened.

I taught in the FBI Academy from, like I say, from late 1971 to all the way to the end of 1977. During that period of time, Howard Teten and myself, and I wouldn't want to exclude other people because there are other very, very fine people in the Academy, but we pretty much spearheaded the psychological end of things, the criminal psychology. There was another section in our same unit which was more bent on sociology, what happens inside of the city as opposed to what's happening with inside of a person, and we veered off completely into the criminal psychology end of things. In that veering off, we were able to put together things that quite honestly, when I now look back on it, I look back with great pride, but I also look back with great amazement.

We were at the period when J. Edgar Hoover was getting very, very ill; getting very, very old. We were bringing things into the forefront, like psychological profiling. And psychological profiling quite frankly when we first started it, we really started it out of a shoebox, literally, because National Academy students would bring in unsolved cases. Howard Teten was the one that really initiated this program, and I sat right next to him. Howard would hand me over a case and would say, "Pat, take a look at this and see what you think about it; review it."

Normally, it would be a jacket that could be maybe six inches tall, and it would be an "unsub" case, unsolved. Often times in it there was a lot of material that had nothing to do with the case. But many times there was material that really did have something pertinent.

Howard was very, very good in reviewing crime scene pictures. He would sit there with his microscope. We'd take a look with his big glass to see whether the blood was going up or was coming down the wall and all this type of stuff. We then started to gain the reputation, and then the realization hit us that we're on to something that's pretty good. Today the television is covered with whether it's Cold Case or CSI or whatever it is. In many ways that's exactly what Howard and I were doing. It wasn't that we were the very first in law enforcement to ever do it, but what we did ultimately, is we gave it discipline. We gave it a real structure.

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PM: Often times what we were doing is going way back into the early years of law enforcement where many of the great detectives, the Sherlock Holmes if you would, who would go in and make such great pronouncements that the person who kills leaves their signature at the crime scene. And that was the kind of thing we were looking for.

That went on for probably two years, and word gradually got out. One of the concerns we had, to be very honest with you, was the administration of the FBI, the Bureau, because that was a period where they didn't want you making guesses at things. They definitely didn't want you to get out on a limb saying that the FBI believes this to happen, so often times it was very unofficial. There was no paper in and out, there was no documentation, it was just something that was done and it was done on kind of a friendship basis.

Well, we started to gain confidence. We really felt pretty good at what we were doing. We started running In-Service Classes in Criminal Psychology, and we started to click. And probably the best case that we ever had, was a very early case in our experience, and that was a crime that took place in Bozeman, Montana. It was the first time an FBI Agent came to us, and actually came directly, and then we cleared it through Division Six, the Criminal Division, and this Agent said he needed help.

It was the kidnapping of Susan Yeager, a family that came from the outskirts of Detroit, Michigan. He sat down and he said, "I got a real tough one, a little girl's missing, she's gone, there's been no ransom demands, we have really nothing; would you guys take a look at this case?"

I remember Teten and myself spending perhaps maybe an inordinate amount of time on the case. But the case itself kind of cried for that because it was a young girl, seven years of age. It was a wonderful family, they were on vacation. And the child was slit out of a tent in the middle of the night, she was dragged away, her little doll was left right next to the tent. The family was just marvelous people, especially the mother, Marietta Yeager. She cooperated immensely in the investigation and throughout.

And we sat down and we very, very slowly and methodically went through that case and we came up with a person who we felt very definitely had committed the crime.

PM: And, it was a fellow by the name of David Meyerhoffer. The unfortunate thing was, for Pete Dunbar, the Case Agent in Bozeman, and Pete, by the way, was a marvelous Agent. I had his son Mike years later in Los Angeles, but Pete was one of these old-time plodding sort of guys. He really got onto a case and never give it up. There were times that we quite frankly and maybe with good reason he thought Teten and I might have needed a head case exam ourselves, but he stuck with it. When we came up with this one suspect, he said to us, "Howard and Pat, we've already given this guy sodium amathol and sodium pentothal," which nowadays is amazing that a subject would ever be allowed to take either one of those. He said, "He's passed."

And, then he said, "We looked hard at him, but we don't think he's the guy." And we came back and we said, "Well, Pete, we think he is the guy." And then we tried to explain the various types of mental disorders, and one in particular that we were trying was instinctual schizophrenia, where you get a mixture of psychopathic behavior, but in simple schizophrenic where the person can live in a remote way be part of the society he's in. Yet be kind of aloof and standoffish. It turned out that he was the aloof and standoffish type, and it turned out also that he was a Vietnam Vet.

It also turned out when we started looking heavily into his background that there were ample areas of his earlier development which showed violent behavior. When he was in high school, he knifed a fellow Boy Scout.

He used to do an awful lot of strange things. He was a carpenter. He spent most of his time working by himself. He was noted in the neighborhood as being very quiet and remote and stayed aloof. He was being raised by his mother and his father was basically off scene. So we kept going back to Pete and we kept saying, "Pete, this is the guy, this is the guy." We suggested to Pete to give him a polygraph. So we also suggested to Pete there's a good chance he's going to pass the polygraph, not pass it, but it will be inconclusive.

And damn that's exactly what happened. He took the polygraph, they had an examiner come up from Denver, and he underwent the polygraph and sailed right through it but it was inconclusive.

Now, I've had different people read the charting on that polygraph, and they clearly came back and said there were opportunities there to really find that there was guilt going on, but nevertheless that was it.

PM: But we had one of the luckiest breaks in the world because we forced him to take the polygraph. It got Meyerhoffer a little bit excited and more interested again in the case. But what we told Pete, we said, "Pete, on the anniversary of this kidnapping, this guy's going to do something." And we highly recommended to him that he set up the family, record them in the suburbs; it was in Farmington, just outside of Detroit, set them up, put wires on it, and so forth.

You may remember in those early days telephone tracing was not science. It's not like it is today, because you had so many pass-throughs from substations, so that's exactly what had happened. On a year to the day to the minute of this kidnapping, Meyerhoffer called the family in Michigan. The mother answered the phone. We could not have trained the mother in responding to this guy in directing her questions in a more fashionable way. She was unbelievable.

But the phone trace somehow bounced from where it was taking place to Florida, to the Southeast, and we lost it. We lost it until about a month and a half later when a farmer gets his telephone bill and he sees this enormous phone call, because the phone call runs about an hour and a half, and the charge was on his bill. He calls the phone company and said he would like to know where this number belongs to, and as soon as he heard the name Yeager, he knew this was involved in the kidnapping of the daughter. And he called the Sheriff's Office and they went out and did a crime scene search and they found a telephone pole.

Mind you, I didn't mention earlier that this Meyerhoffer was trained in the military in communications, so he knew exactly what to do to hook into a telephone wire. And that's where he made his phone call and Pete Dunbar called us and said, "Hey we got a trace, it's the farmer found his bill...and everything like that, and he said we got a live one." We kept insisting it was Meyerhoffer and he was still very reluctant to go for Meyerhoffer. And we said well, "What are we going to do?" How can we really break Meyerhoffer? How can we break him from what he's saying and what we feel is reality?" I think it was my suggestion, I said the only way to do it is have a confrontation between the mother and the subject.

Now, you're taking a look at the mid-70's in the FBI, to be able to pull that off we felt was impossible. Not that we had anything against anybody in the Criminal Division, but you'd never get it to go all the way up. Someone along the way would say, "absolutely too chancy." So instead we had the Sheriff's Office do the liaison with the mother, and the mother came out. Pete Dunbar was very much involved, and we were very directive in it as well, and she confronted him on the street and he denied it vehemently. Absolutely totally denied any involvement.

PM: Marietta Yeager went back home with her husband to the Michigan area and it wasn't two days that she was home she gets a call from Salt Lake City and once again it's the same caller and now we knew we had the right guy because he was saying you've told the FBI, you've told the police, you've told them everything about me. She started then calling him David, and he vehemently denied the name David was his. It turned out that the FBI was waiting for him as he was coming back into town, with the Sheriff's Office.

They arrested him; they found the hotel ticket that he stayed in in his pocket. They found gas receipts which implicated him coming back in. We got a warrant to search his house and it was something that we had also predicted. You might say it was just sheer luck, but we felt that this was the kind of a guy who was a killer who really liked to keep his victim. When they opened up the freezer, they found the hard story, not only did he keep his victim, a 7 and a half year old child, but we found a couple of other victims in there as well. He was arrested, admitted to killing four people.

Unfortunately, the day after he was arrested despite our warnings, he hung himself in prison. I think he took a huge chapter with him of perhaps maybe other crimes. He killed the only girl that he ever tried to date, he killed her. She was a beautiful young lady, 18 years of age, Sandra Marie Geitman Smolagen [phonetic] was her name. He actually shot from a sniper position a brother of a Deputy Sheriff and killed him. The kid fell down into the river and then, of course, he had killed another Boy Scout in camp. So, Meyerhoffer took a lot of mystery, I think, to his grave.

That was the first case that profiling really hit the mark within the FBI. Division Six got very much excited about it. It really became an institution to the point, right now, where they have the Center for Violent Crimes and it's like it's always been there in the FBI, but it started out in a shoebox and now is being emulated on television time and time again.

But what was interesting during this time was paralleling profiling, and this all came out of the Training Division. The New York City Police Department got together, I'll never forget Harvey Schlossberg and Frank Bolt [phonetic].

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PM: They put together, based on what had happened in Munich, a tremendous area now starting development with terrorism, and they were very much afraid of hostage-taking situations. New York City put together two hostage negotiation teams. I would have to wholeheartedly give Frank Bolt and Harvey Schlossberg the credit for starting the concept for hostage negotiating. They had invited Howard Teten and me into New York to teach those two classes they had. There was a lot of gimmickry in those days, when I look back on it, and we were having a lot of fun because they had periscopes where they would have to look up, and everything.

Honestly we felt that was really not a necessary tool but it kept them busy. But they really came up with a marvelous concept that, instead of just barricading a place and assaulting, they tried the concept of talking people out and keeping them alive.

When Teten and I came out of teaching those two classes ~ there were two separate groups. Teten and I said these guys are on to something, and we better grab it. And we did grab it. We put together a course in hostage negotiations back in the mid-1970's which, quite honestly, had caught on like wildfire. A lot of guys who had been trained in criminology, they said this is the perfect complement; we really would like to go.

But there were some who didn't want to go, because some had the concept that they would have to go face-to-face with these guys, and they didn't choose that would be the best thing for them. And that wasn't really what we taught. But based on criminal psychology, based on psychological profiling, we then put together a real national program on hostage negotiating, which in turn the police instructors within the various Field Offices said, "Hey, this is a great package. Let's start doing it ourselves within our local Divisions." So it grew, it really grew everywhere, to the point where I think you'd have to look long and hard in the United States today to find a police department that doesn't have a unit or some sort of grouping of people that will handle hostage negotiating techniques.

I had a funny experience because New York was so imbued with it, then you go to Los Angeles. There was always the contest between LA and New York. LA would say that New York is not as disciplined as we are; we're far more militaristic; we're way better at SWAT. And at the same time New Yorkers would say that these guys from the LAPD were fast on the trigger; they lacked discipline; they were terrible investigators; New York investigators/detectives were a lot better.

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PM: Well, we went in to teach the first class in hostage negotiating to the LAPD, and they all showed up in SWAT outfits, which was not our concept at all. And they sat and they listened. They were very, very polite. It was up in the SAC's conference room in the Los Angeles Office on the 17th floor.

They were very, very polite, but they are, in many ways, a shrewd department. They, like us, going into New York, sensed that this is a tool that we gotta have; we can't always be banging the door in and shooting them up and hitting them with the frag grenades, etc., etc.

So, they started a concept that they had a 6-man SWAT team. What they did they added a seventh man, dressed him up as a Swat-er, but used him as a negotiator. We always felt that that was maybe not the best way to go, but for them it turned out to be the best way to go. They were able to incorporate hostage negotiating.

Back in the late 70's, hostage negotiating was a real terrorist tool. It was a tool to also beat the crazies and the criminal. There were a number of hostage cases that I got sent on during the period of William Webster acting as Director. He would always measure what the hostage case was all about. It was gaining national publicity and gaining an awful lot of national attention under pressure from the Department of Justice. He came to the point where he would send me to the hostage case, and I became his favorite person to send. There's no doubt in my mind, that had I had one real bad case, I'd be his less favorite person to send. I'd be put on the back burner.

But, God was good, and I was very, very fortunate. A lot of the cases that I got sent to had huge national publicity, the first of which was a case that happened in Indianapolis. Subject, Tony Kiritsis was his name. It was right under the beginning of the new Attorney General Griffin Bell. Griffin Bell had just come into office. This particular case had no where...the guy had a sawed-off shotgun, he tied it to the head of the mortgage company president and paraded the mortgage company president around Indianapolis. It was in February so it was cold as blazes. There was ice on the street and everything like that, and he was screaming and he was full of profanity and everything like that.

PM: So they flew me in for this thing, and I'll never forget, I sat down and I listened to all the tapes they had and everything. The only thing that you really had to do because you had the Indianapolis State Police, you had the Indianapolis City Police. Well, they were going head to head with each other. They weren't agreeing with each other or anything. And Kiritsis was ranting and raving on television; he was on the radio and everything. People were calling in to him; they were agitating him by the call-ins and everything. You saw a total lack of discipline that they had let the inner core of this hostage case to go to hell in a hand basket because you had, as I said, people calling in and all sorts of interference.

I'll never forget when I reviewed the whole thing and listened to it, I came and we called a meeting together. I said, "Hey, you guys got this one in the palm of your hand." It was basically a salesman's job. I had to convince them that they had it exactly where it should be with the duration of time that had gone by. And this is a case that lasted almost three days, and had national attention. It was on every news and everything. And, by being able to convince the two police departments that they had it in the right position, there were just a few little nuts that had to be tightened, a few little things that had to be... First of all I said, "We gotta completely cut him off from any sort of access to the media." From there on in things started to work. We isolated him, but crazy things would happen, like they always do in cases. All of a sudden on television, and of course now at this point Kiritsis had gotten his victim up into his apartment. He claimed that he had wired his apartment and that, if anyone tried to enter, it would blow the whole place up which, in fact, it really could have. We found out because he had set up gasoline and candles.

Well, on national television, on comes an ordinance expert with the military telling us how he's going to breach the wall of Kiritsis's apartment. Well that's exactly what Kiritsis didn't need to hear. Then that further put us to the point where we said, "Hey, if anybody wants to talk in this case, they gotta come through us." We let him wind down...we let him wind down...I kept feeling that this guy is going to break at some point. I even had his brother cooking Greek food across the hall, blowing it over, hopefully that he'd smell it and open the door and come out. The family got nowhere on all of this.

PM: And then we had a tremendous conflict with the United States Attorney out there. His name was Young. A man who subsequent to the case, a couple of years later, was arrested and I believe convicted of lewd and very devious type acts. But he and I got into it real big because he charged with me, wanting to know who sent me out there, whose authority am I negotiating with, etc., etc. I had absolutely no patience for him, and really laid the phone down and walked away from him, but as it turns out, the issue became whether or not immunity was offered. I kept saying, "No, we don't have an issue of immunity because the United States Attorney's Office is already denying declining prosecution."

It turns out that Young denied that his office had ever declined prosecution which was an out and out lie. You decline, you can't make another decision the next day and say, hold it I didn't do the right thing. I'm going to now hold my prosecutive opinion until the thing is over. But the Attorney General, Griffin Bell, believed very much that immunity was offered and it never was offered, and I held to that. In the meantime the Mayor of the City kept coming to me and saying hey when is this going to end. I just grabbed one out of the sky, "I think it's going to end a little bit after midnight."

And it turned out that the case did end at 12:18 a.m. when he finally surrendered his weapon after coming down in front of all of the TV cameras, and pacing up and down and swearing up and down, and telling how much he wanted to shoot that shotgun. And he lived. I never forget when he turned the shotgun lose, they kicked this guy Richard Hall, the victim, and threw him in my direction and I brought him over, and the guy was in a total state of shock, laid him on one of the beds in this apartment building and told him that he was going to live. He was a person who was probably a pretty mean and feisty businessman and probably did in many ways do in Tony Kiritsis in the land deal that he had.

But here was a man because of that hostage case, he totally changed his life; he became very much involved in society, very responsive to his community. He did a complete about face because I think he realized that the way he had been treating people almost cost him his life. It was a great success, but I was put up for a good period of time on the hook as to whether or not I did wrong or did right.

Another hostage case that took place and it was involved with the Hanaffi Muslims in Washington, DC. That was a case where, you know, where clearly the Department of Justice wanted to know why the FBI is going to send Mullany to this case. I'll never forget Jim Adams. I was sitting with Jim Adams in the office and Jim Adams told the Department of Justice in no uncertain terms, he said, "If you read the paper on Mullany, you'll know that the Department of Justice had no problems with him; we don't have any problem with him, and we're sending him to that case."

PM: That certainly was better than any Letter of Commendation, which by the way never came, not that you do things for that, or any sort of monetary payment, just to hear him stand behind what I had done.

And the second case that happened, a major major case, was the Hanaffi Muslim case in Washington which could have cost the lives of 168 people in the B'nai B'rith Building. But the dynamics of that case were such that, while strategically it was impossible to get up on top of the District Building, and be able to get to seven subjects, who had over a hundred long-arm weapons that they brought up there, and had well over 160 hostages. The only way that you could get into that building would be to use the rappelling but you'd have to come in through windows and crash the windows open to get in there and you'd be a sitting duck. We knew it would be an absolute total slaughter.

The threat that they had, Abdullah Moscalise, was to start chopping the heads off all the people up there. We used psychology, we used profilers. This man, Abdullah Moscalise, he had a management problem up there because he had 168 victims plus his seven people and they had to go to the bathroom.

He made each one of those victims, if they had to go to the bathroom, to clean it before they got in and clean it when they came out. You take just that act alone for three days, it's a mammoth task to perform. But we worked on that cleanliness and it turned out to be the key to get to this guy.

MO: Why did he initially takeover the mosque?

PM: The real reason he took over and it was a tragic event. Abdullah Moscalise had lived in the house that was owned by Abdul Jamar, the former Lew Alcindor from New York, the basketball player. He had been renting it. But there was a huge conflict between the Black Muslim group in Chicago and the group that was up now, the Hanaffi Muslims. This conflict was such that of all a sudden this Chicago group came down and they literally slaughtered Abdullah Moscalise's family. They went into his house. They killed his children, they killed his wife, they drowned a six month old baby in a sink. This is what Abdullah Moscalise came into. So as a negotiator, you couldn't sit and negotiate on the phone with Calise and say, "Calise, this never happened." It did happen, but what Calise wanted, he felt that justice wasn't being served. The guys who killed his family were arrested. They were tried and convicted, they were sentenced and were put in prison. Calise kept saying they're in prison, you're feeding them, you have not done what Allah wanted done. Allah would have a head for a head, a tooth for a tooth, etc., etc. I want you to bring these to me, bring these guys to me. And there was no doubt in my mind, I mean this man was 100% sincere, that he would have beheaded them.

PM: The dilemma that you had is that you felt in a way for his purpose of taking these hostages. It was very well planned because he had three places that he grabbed. He had the District Building. The unfortunate thing in the District Building is his followers in that building shot and killed a guy, and he was on the street actually when I arrived. Calise knew very well, by the fact that they had already shot and killed somebody, that they were in deep trouble.

I don't think he really entered into this thing to kill anybody else other than the people that killed his family. Then he had taken over a Temple and then, of course, he had the B'nai B'rith Building where he had an awful lot of hostages there as well. But, that was his purpose. His purpose was to get those that killed his family to be brought to him, and then he would execute them. We knew very well there was no way the government could be part of anything like that. So, we worked on him, we worked on him, and we worked on him. There was a time we really thought we were within moments of a head coming out of the window.

MO: What did you do?

PM: But a funny thing happened. We had offered them food and he had agreed to the food to come up. You know, sandwiches that were going to be made. Now mind you, most of the hostages that were being held were Jewish people so you weren't sending up too many ham sandwiches...turkey and stuff like that. Well, when we had that offer out and we were going to deliver it, that got to be the key point where he was going to cut the negotiations off. And we were able to steer him. Mind you now the whole issue of dirt, filth, all of that was bugging him intensely.

So we then diverted his attention, when he was saying, no, that's the end of negotiations and no I know you are not going to bring me food, that's the end.. At the end we completely took a flip flop. I sat there writing notes to the chief, Chief Bob Gray (?), who's long since passed away, and I'm saying, "Ask him does he want the mayonnaise on the side?"

We asked him this stupid question, and it distracted him long enough to say, "Yes, put the mayonnaise on the side." And then you got into the mustard and he said, "Make sure that they are individually wrapped because you gotta hand these things out," and everything. Then all of a sudden the caretaker part of him took over and the concern for making sure things were clean, and it totally distracted him from the thing at hand where he had really basically denied and said that's the end of negotiating.

PM: And it was after that, food was delivered. He felt a little sense of calmness. Here are the guys from Quantico, the SWAT Team standing by with helicopters which scared the hell out of me. They were really thinking that they could crash these windows and I'm saying to myself this is a suicide mission if we don't succeed.

Well, it turns out that finally he agreed to a meeting. We had set up a meeting with Ambassadors from Syria, Ambassadors from Lebanon and Egypt. Now mind you, you've got these three Arab Ambassadors ~ they're willing to sit down at a meeting with Abdullah Moscalise who claims to be a Muslim, but basically the purpose of sitting down and negotiating is to save Jewish people. It was like...you couldn't make a movie out of something like this, and that's exactly what turned out.

And really what it was, and the reason why we set up this meeting, was to further build up the aggrandizement if you would, of Abdullah Moscalise. You had to make him really seem like a leader. He agreed to the meeting and in the meeting they offered him only one thing. He knew he was going to be arrested, but they offered that he could go home that night, which is a technicality in Washington, DC. You can be charged with murder, but you can be allowed to go back home and ultimately stay under house arrest.

And that's what he agreed upon, and he coughed up his followers. His followers went to jail and his followers never got out of jail; as a matter of fact, just a year ago I checked. Abdullah Moscalise himself, he's a much older man now obviously, is in jail, he had put a motion in to be released, but there is no intention of releasing him from prison. He's paid his crime and I guess the jury holding him in there is the fact that there is such a cruelty to it. They didn't intentionally beat those people up, but emotionally they did, and it was a horrifying situation, it really was.

But, that was 1977.

MO: Going back to that case, I mean it was so unrealistic for him to make that request that the prisoners be released to his custody...there's no way that's going to happen, so you're dealing with somebody you know is making unrealistic demands.

PM: But see, in his mind, he felt that he had enough live bodies that he could make it a realistic thing. The realism that we had to deal with was his history. We had no way as negotiators of having any room to say these guys who are in prison haven't been that cruel to you. We couldn't minimize them at all. They were cruel to his family. The six month old baby drowned in the sink was cruelty in and of itself, and his thirst for revenge was immense.

MO: He really believed that he could get to the point that...

PM: He absolutely believed that we would have, and I guess what he believed is that the killers, he felt that the justice system might not have such a heavy premium on them, you know that we would cough them up, but there was no way you could. And we would tell him that. Bob Gray would just say to him you're asking us to do the impossible.

But, it was one of the most fascinating cases, and crazy things happened at that time. One of them was, for example, and I think this is clearly the craziest thing that ever happened. Prime Minister Callahan was coming to visit the United States, and don't forget Jimmy Carter was the President at the time. And we were told that the cannoneers were going to shoot their welcoming cannon which is just over on the Mall which is very close to the District Building and not that far from the B'nai B'rith Building. We said to ourselves, my God if they shoot these cannons off Abdullah Moscallise is going to figure for sure we've assaulted one of his divisions. We told Calise up front, only he thought it was a trick, he said, "It's a trick, I'm not going along with this, don't tell me what's going to happen," and he said, "If you assault my position, we immediately start to kill people." And that's what we were afraid of.

So we got a hold of Jodi Powell at the White House. We told Jodi our dilemma. We said, "Jodi, you know, this is for real." I mean the whole city was kind of shut down because traffic wasn't going anywhere, so we told Jodi Powell you've gotta cancel the cannoneers. He says no problem. So he got in touch with the cannoneers who were from Ft. Myer and you've got the cannoneers cancelled. They were on the bus driving back to Ft. Myer or wherever they were, maybe they were in Belvoir, either one of those places.

Then Jodi Powell is in briefing the President, and he said to the President, "By the way, you know they have this serious hostage case going and I've authorized the cancellation of the cannoneers." And the President became unglued. And the President said, "No way, we're going to have the cannoneers welcome the Prime Minister. That's caving into terrorism, so we had that to deal with."

So, then Jodi Powell comes back to us and says, "You guys gotta do something to get these cannoneers back, the President wants them back." Well, guess what happened? Callahan came, there was no way, it was not the day of the cell phone, there was no way to get in touch with the cannoneers, so the cannoneers were still on the road going home and they never did show up and we didn't have any cannoneers go off. Thank God! Who knows what would have happened.

PM: So, it was a fascinating case, and a case that I think really brought together the Washington Metropolitan Police Department. Bob Gray and I became very, very close friends. We were close friends beforehand. Cullanain was the Chief and we worked very, very close because they had a couple of other hostage cases at the DC Jail which were maybe not as tight. They ended one time on one of those with a takeover of the DC Jail where the Metropolitan Police and the U.S. Marshals actually ended up in a fist fight. So, that was another case.

See all of this came out of the Behavioral Science Unit. It was one of the greatest periods, the 1970's. And probably my culmination on it was I then, after 1977, got signed out as an Inspector's Aide, and then came back in and took a Unit in the Terrorism Section, but in 1979 when you had the Iranian crisis, I was TDYed over to State Department for that entire period of 444 days. Give or take some on the front end to get it situated, where I actually worked the Iranian crisis with a CIA psychiatrist by the name of Bob Blum, and a State Department psychiatrist. Our task was calling the compound in Tehran and going in using all the extensions in the different rooms and charting each one of the rooms to see who would answer the phone. We had NSA behind us with all of its equipment picking up the background noise.

So every time we'd call in to the Embassy, we'd get the guy who picked up the phone, the first question we'd ask him was who's this, and he'd say this is "X." They identified themselves as "X", "Y" and "Z." And, for the most part, the three guys who answered the phone could speak pretty good English. We couldn't speak Farsi, so we would try to revert them to English right away. What we were able to do with NSA, we were able to pick up actual names. So let's say one very Middle Eastern name or something like that was Zaib [phonetic] or something like that, and if was "X" who picked up the phone and he, in fact, was Zaib, instead of calling him "X," we would say Zaib.

You know, we're calling, the medical team is calling, and Zaib would say, well how did you get my name? And we pitched them one against the other. We'd say well "Y" told us who you were, and then you'd hear them screaming at each other, yelling 'why you told the name', but we were actually picking it up through electronic surveillance that NSA had put into place.

PM: But what we were doing, we were doing two things. We were trying to get the layout of where most of the hostages were being held in the compound. At the same token we were actually getting general, very good, medical information out about the hostages themselves. In other words, if they had high blood pressure, if they had heart problems, if they were diabetics or something like that, we would talk to them, and for the most part they were responsive. They didn't want to kill their hostages, so if we told them that so and so has, let's say Morehead, Morehead was an actual hostage that was over there. If we'd say well, Mr. Morehead's a terrible diabetic, he's got to make sure he has his insulin, then they would go to Morehead and they'd find out, are you a diabetic?...Morehead wasn't, but Morehead was a guy who kind of caused another problem because they thought he was CIA. He absolutely set up the situation. I found this out later on where he wouldn't talk to any of them, and he would just constantly read books.

So that happened during that period of time when I was assigned to the Terrorism Section. But then after the Terrorism Section, I was very happy to get assigned up to the ASAC in Baltimore. I went up there with Ed Hegarty, Lord rest his soul. Ed and I became very, very close friends. His background was very similar to mine; he had studied for the priesthood. Ed was a very tough man to work for, but easy to work for because you knew where he was coming from. He wasn't a phony; he was a very disciplined person. And the Agents in the Baltimore Office really appreciated him. I had two years up there with him, and he was really a solid guy.

And, the one thing, the two years in Baltimore as ASAC [Assistant Special Agent in Charge] was really a highlight in my career. Now the trouble was, and we can all look back on our transfers, but this was at a period of time with interest rates in the Washington, DC area in general were 17%. So to sell a house down near the FBI Academy was very, very difficult, and, if not impossible, to be honest with you.

What we didn't have in place at that time was the transfer policy where the government buys the house and all that good stuff. So I remember...I forget what year it was...the actual cost, but in a nice white Chevy with a huge whip antenna I remember doing that 73 mile drive between Lake Montclair and the Baltimore Office pretty much every day. But I did always keep a set of clothes in the trunk, so that in case we had an emergency or something like that you could stay overnight and you'd have no problem.

PM: And Hegarty was very understanding. Of course, it really made sure you didn't push it on the early end, you know, show up at 10 o'clock. I was always in the office at least by 7 o'clock and obviously would stay as late as six or seven depending on what went on. I had a couple of guys that were supervisors that really would help out as well, they had an extra place. Then I had a sister who lived in that area.

But after my two years there, I was very fortunate to put in for and get the assignment to the Senior Seminar. I wasn't too sure to be honest with you how the FBI looked upon the Senior Seminar. In other words, when they would assign somebody over there, and they assigned a lot of good people over there, Dick Held was assigned over there, Andy Duffin was assigned over there, and I came right in after Andy Duffin.

MO: What is it?

PM: The Senior Seminar is the very highest level school in government. It's run by the State Department, the Foreign Service Institute, and it normally is the pool where the State Department picks its Ambassadors. They generally would send a guy to that school and they always even referred to it as Ambassador training. But they opened it up to the military, they opened it up to the FBI, they didn't open it up to DEA, they did open it up to Secret Service, but it was mostly FBI, Secret Service and State Department guys, and the military at that point.

But to get assigned there, you went there for a year, an entire year, full time. And you sat with all these guys and basically you studied international diplomacy.

There was a section of that course where you took up domestic affairs, so you traveled all around the United States and you went into places...let's say if you were looking at the riots in Watts or something like that, you'd go out and you'd sit down and chat with all the Chiefs of Police and figure out what happened and see what the implications it might have on society and all that good stuff.

It was a fabulous school from the standpoint you were exposed to the highest level of government; you were brought over routinely on a monthly basis to have a briefing from the Secretary of State. It really was great, but I think inside of the FBI, they didn't have the imagination as to really how to properly use this. It almost appeared to me at some time that it was a way of putting a guy on a shelf for a year and kind of getting him out of the way until maybe they could find another place for him. And then they would always maybe pick people that they felt had a little more education or could keep up with the school better than someone else.

PM: I don't know what the decision was. But what clearly was the break if you got assigned to the school, it was a great privilege to go, and an absolutely fantastic thing for the future to have on your resume and stuff like that, but it was the coming back. When you came back, you were kind of like illegitimate at the family reunion. Where you've been for a year? Oh, you've been off; you've been on a vacation or something like that. In the meantime, you were really working your tail off at this school because the last thing you wanted to do was fail out of it and then you'd really become a disgrace coming back. Well, we sent him to this school and he couldn't hack it, and they had to send him back.

So when I came back...you went over in the rank of Inspector...so when I came back I came back to the Inspection Division and stayed on the Inspection Division for probably close to two years, so if you could time while you're at State Department, I probably had as long a time on the inspection staff as an Inspector, than anyone probably ever had in the Bureau. Because notoriously when you would get assigned to the inspection staff as an Inspector you could be on there two months, three months and out as an SAC [Special Agent in Charge].

But the problem was at the time that I was on, there were no SAC's that were going out. There were no openings because when Webster first came in he made a real batch of appointments to clearly young guys as SAC's, so they pretty much had covered all the spots, and the SAC's were not rotating quickly. They were rotating very, very slowly. So you had to wait, and the two years I was an Inspector, I remember one office opened. And now you could put your hand up, whether you remember, well you could put your hand up because they could laugh at you, but a willingness to go was always good depending on where it was.

One that did come up was Anchorage, Alaska, and I expressed a willingness. I had a young family; my wife thought it would have been fantastic experience to do, but that didn't come. Kenny Arnold got it instead.

So you put your hand up, but the other one that came open was Jackson, Mississippi. That was about the last place in the world cause I was working, getting very, very close to age 50, and I said there ain't no way I'm going to end up in Jackson, Mississippi. I have nothing against the place but I had nothing that connected me to the place.

And then what happened was, you had the Olympics coming to Los Angeles, and I was on the inspection staff with a couple of pretty good guys. One who was on there was a guy who came out of Division Five, Jim [the name is just skipping my mind], he ended up in New York...I apologize for missing the name, but anyhow, he was actually given an assignment to go out to Los Angeles for three months...Jimmy Fox.

MO: Oh, Fox. I knew a Fox from Chicago and New York.

PM: Yeah, great guy. We spent most of our inspection days together, but he was also looking for a seat. They did a funny thing...it was almost like Solomon cutting the baby in half. They sent Fox to Los Angeles for three months, and at the same time what they ended up doing is they assigned me to Los Angeles, but Fox to New York, but then they said Fox would go to LA for three months and then once his three months were up, I would go take his place, and that's what came down.

Now, the logic behind it is beyond me. Richard Bretzing was the SAC and, you know, he had input in it; maybe he knew Fox, certainly I did, but the other thing that I kind of carried was I was a Training Division Agent. You get into the Training Division you get a label, so in other words, the word could have been out there, well, he doesn't have that much criminal experience because he's been in Quantico for so long. Great public speaker and all this sort of good stuff, but maybe what Bretzing figured he'd rather have somebody who had a little bit more hands-on especially during the Olympics. Whatever it was, we did exactly that.

Fox went out and then I came out; well, actually it really helped me tremendously because it gave me a six month lead time almost to transfer to Los Angeles, which with five children, I kind of needed it and used it. It was very fascinating which actually would turn out to be my last assignment in the Bureau. The day we arrived in Los Angeles, I call into the office. And I had the kids in the van and a little follow-up Datsun DC 10 or whatever it was, and we parked into Camarillo and got temporary quarters. I called in, and Jim Fox says to me, "Pat, you gotta come in right away." I said, "You gotta be kidding me."

It was Sunday afternoon...no it wasn't a Sunday, it was Friday afternoon. And I said to him, "Can't you tell me what's going on?" He said, "No, but you've gotta get in here immediately."

So I left the family up in Camarillo in temporary quarters, drove into the office, and got into Fox's room, he shuts the door, and there was a guy in there from Headquarters. He's sitting there, and Fox says to me, "Pat, we got a major case breaking." I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "Well, we got evidence, and there's no question about it, we got one of our guys is a spy." And it was the R. W. Miller case.

I'll never forget, I had a white shirt on, I had white pants on, white shoes and I looked like either a guy selling ice cream or a doctor or something. Fox proceeds to tell me, he said, "I'm leaving tomorrow morning, I'm going to report back to New York. Bretzing is in Hawaii and the case, (this is right after the Olympics), and you gotta take this thing over. "

PM: And that started the R. W. Miller investigation which went on pretty intensively for a period of three months before he was arrested and ultimately convicted of the crime. It was clearly no doubt that he was the spy because they had a technique which has been declassified but there's no purpose in mentioning it now, where they had coverage on the Consulate in San Francisco that clearly showed the contact which Miller had made and left no doubt. So immediately Headquarters sent somebody out and they had him kind of coordinating what was going on. But clearly we set up an operation which was using mostly the San Francisco Agents because we felt we couldn't use ours because it just wouldn't work. It wasn't too long all of a sudden people were coming in and saying 'hey Pat or Mr. Mullany, I swear I think I saw the San Francisco aircraft hovering over the office.' Ah...no such thing. And then we had one of the clerk's come up from down, we used to call it the old Xerox machine, but I don't know what they called it, the copy machine, and she swore that a camera was put up over the copy machine. I knew the camera was up there, but I tried to tell her, nah don't worry about it.

So, it was very, very hard to keep that balance on that. Then as history brings it out, there was an Agent that wound up pulling into a park area down by the freeway, and [unintel] and to pull his car in just kind of taking it easy or doing whatever to catch his breath before he went into the office. Well, it turns out that he pulled the car in right next to Richard Miller and Svetlana. Miller then felt for sure that he was under surveillance or caught or whatever, but that clearly was one of the most difficult cases, not from the standpoint of what we lost or what we potentially could have lost. I think the biggest thing we lost was the reputation of never having anyone penetrate us and that's what it was.

Miller was a clown and Miller was a disaster. He should never have been in the FBI to begin with. A pathetic case. He had a huge weight problem, and I'll never forget spending almost three hours with him "counseling" him for his weight problem. Of course, it was all during the time they were bugging his car. And when they successfully bugged his car, even Miller didn't recognize that when the bug was in and ready to go on, proven to be operating, that it was the first time my telephone rang in two and a half hours. Any trained investigator must have thought nobody likes this senior ASAC, or why isn't his phone ever ringing. I'm in there and he's pounding me on how to lose weight, but actually I didn't have to pound him much because he spoke so clearly...he was so full of b.s., as to the things he was doing to lose weight and everything. In the meantime, of course, we knew that he had been doing what he had been charged with.

PM: Many, many times on a surveillance of him, we'd see him come in. One time we saw him coming in with a big huge shopping bag and right away we'd see he had files in the shopping bag. He took them up to his little desk because he had remember, he was in that small little office where he had a tech, you know covered a tech, and he opened up the shopping bag and it was full of candy and goods that he filled his desk full of to eat for the rest of the day. In the meantime he's telling me he's on a great diet and he's talking to his psychologist to lose weight.

But, it was a tragedy that we clearly got away from the point that we could say that we've never been penetrated. That's what hurt the Agency the most. His life, whatever happened to him, of course, sent to prison, his life just totally came apart, and I don't know that it had too much cohesiveness to it to begin with, but it was a big point. But the point that I made is that it was a period in Los Angeles where there was a tremendous upheaval because that spy case ... we went through a huge emphasis on the relationship with the Mexicans and the minorities and everything. It was a period where Matt Perez's shadow was still over the office. Matt and Bretzing didn't get along at all, and then the Mormon issue came up and there was an awful lot of hatred and an awful lot of discontent.

And the regular Agents were sitting back and looking at this thing and regarding most of it to be a bunch of "bs" and being totally blown out of proportion, but you had a Mormon SAC, you had Bryce Christensen who was also a Mormon. And I'll never forget after the series of events that happened when the Mormon issues started to get as much publicity as the spy issue. And then, of course, they connected the two of them that the reason why he was treated so easily and that Bryce Christensen had kind of treated him as kind of a penitent if you would...someone who came to confess his sins to him because of his position in the church.

It complicated things so much that you had schools of thought that just wouldn't listen to each other. If they were the pro-Perez group, they were pro-Perez. There was a lot of trouble in the office in some respects John Guse [phonetic] was looked upon by Bretzing as somewhat of a traitor that things were being leaked to the media. I went back to a meeting one time in Washington where John Otto pulled a [unintel] on me and started screaming the fact that we had no female Agents on our bank robbery squad.

So you went from the Mormon issue to the spy issue, then all of a sudden the women got involved in it, that they weren't being equally distributed. And I'll never forget Otto screaming at me that if you don't go back and correct this, I'll fire you. And I said to him, well, just for your information, I'm eligible to retire.

PM: In other words I wasn't going to take a beating because there was nothing that could be further from the truth about Joe Sheffalo, a finer man you wouldn't want to see in the Bureau, he was just a terrific guy. Then what really irked me was there was a couple of people back in Washington and it was all a meeting on recruiting and career development and everything like that, and there was one particular SAC out of Philadelphia who tried to kiss up to Otto and made this profound statement that he just couldn't see how in this day and age that anybody who could be a supervisor could not look upon having, you know, the equality of females. It was such horse crap; that's when I just said to him, "Get off your preaching box, you don't even know Joe Sheffalo." I said, I'm there, I know him."

MO: What was the actual accusation against...?

PM: The accusation against him was that he was keeping females off the bank robbery squad and that he didn't want female Agents, and it was absolutely nothing that could be further from the truth. You might remember the one female Agent was on the bank robbery squad, I'm trying to think...she was actually the daughter of an SAC. Oh, Cindy Larson, and she had asked to get off bank robberies, but she used the example that was being used. And that all appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* and that further infuriated things as times went on.

MO: What year are we talking about?

PM: We're talking 1985; I'm trying to think exactly. Well, I know exactly it was August, the end of August 1984 that Miller spied and the Miller case went on. I had to appear in court three times and I remember my retirement because I had the role of the administrative Agent in Charge I had to testify to the records, so each one of those cases, I was back on the witness stand on those cases.

And that's, kind of in a nutshell, was a rather glorious career, if I had to do it all over, I mean with some of the things I got involved with, some of the people I got involved with, some of the cases I got involved with. In my early days as an Agent in Los Angeles, I sat on Veteran Avenue when we were watching television and I was checking off this Agent and Robert Kennedy got assassinated. And that's a case I've used in criminal psychology for years as to the actual psychological makeup of Sirhan Sirhan.

I was rather shocked at one of my classmates, Bill Bailey who kind of made a life after the Bureau, he didn't stay on until retirement. He talked about the multiple gun issue and the fact that the crime scene was not worked properly on the Sirhan Sirhan killing and there could be nothing further from the truth. That was a fascinating case.

PM: The nice part that I had on it, and it was just luck I guess, I got to interview the maitre d' who was holding the arm of Kennedy leading him through the kitchen. A German fellow. Then I also got to interview the college kid who was holding Robert Kennedy's head when Robert Kennedy actually went into unconsciousness and just never came out of unconsciousness. And his last words were "how's Bill." And he was talking about Bill Barry who is a former FBI Agent who had been traveling with Kennedy as his personal aide and his kind of all-around utility man, and Bill Barry was a great Agent. I don't even know to this day if Bill realizes that the last words that Robert Kennedy had to say was "how's he?"

MO: He was his bodyguard?

PM: Yes. And the other one that I had the chance to interview was the Oriental kid who had been working as a busboy. So in that investigation where the entire office was used, I just had the good fortune of getting some pretty good interviews in that case. That case was really investigated with tremendous intensity.

But, it was a great career.

MO: Just to go back a little bit, you did talk to Miller for a long time; what was his profile like?

PM: Well, Miller was...his profile probably could be summed up in a very few words. Miller was a slacker; and none of them are going to be psychological words. He was a user, he was a very self-centered person, he was lazy. Basically he was really a lazy human being.

The whole thing that he tried to put forth was, in his defense, was the fact that he was trying to do something that would reverse his disastrous career, absolutely amazed me because even what he did as a spy was terrible. You just don't go about spying the way in which he went about it.

It was self-centered and it showed forth that he was willing to accept anything from her. The fact that he would have sex with her showed really no self-respect for him, even for himself. Because at the point where he was in life and she was as ugly as ugly could be. Here's a woman during the course of the investigation of her and a surveillance of her, an ambulance was called to the house one night and they carted her out to pump her stomach cause she had just finished taking a glass full of Drano. Then you say to yourself, well, 'Miller, how do you fit with somebody like this?'

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PM: The thing that I finally believed, I firmly believe is that Miller was recruited by the Soviets. That Miller was targeted, and I blame some of the case handlers of Svetlana who had just too big a mouth in telling too many war stories about what was going on in the office. Miller was portrayed as a buffoon, you know, by the handler, and I can't think of his name right now. Press me and I could think of his name...

MO: John Hunt.

PM: Yeah and he just completely misspoke and came out with too much stuff. I believe Miller, that the phone call was first made to him, and then she specifically asked for him, and she sought him out, and she rolled him in like a top, and it was just as easy as could be.

The other thing about Miller was his complete... when you're self-centered, there's nothing else that really matters. He had this mammoth size family, he had a wife, they were always pressed hard for money. And the kinds of things that he would allow himself to do - the selling of Amway products out of the back of the car, all of that's totally believable, but the tragedy in all of this, at no point did he use any of his intelligence to work, and to do a decent job.

The trouble is that every once in a while you bump into someone who loved to shift the blame. The guy who wrote the book, who sat on his defense table. I was absolutely aghast at his behavior. To this day that man really thinks that Richard Miller was a good Agent, that was duped by the FBI and misled and everything. There couldn't be anything further from the truth. Miller knew exactly what he was doing and it was consumed by his own self-importance which, unfortunately, he couldn't see to correctly, but I didn't have much respect as you can well imagine for him.

MO: Let me get back to just a couple of other things. What was the primary source when you started on the profiling? What books did you go to initially? Was there anything written on this when you two sat down and started the profiling?

PM: No. The interesting thing is there was very, very little that you could read on profiling. As a matter of fact if you go back and search the literature now and if you do a LEXUS/NEXUS or if you do even just a computer check, the real profiling, it really started at the Academy. Much of the literature will really give credit to Howard and myself for the starting of it. There were a couple of other people who was phenomenal. Bob Ressler, he was one of the best teachers that we ever had at the Academy. Bob was a feisty from the standpoint, he really initiated on his own.

PM: He reminded me of how we started profiling, but he initiated when he would go out to police schools. He initiated knocking on doors in some of these prisons and going in and interviewing the people that we were lecturing about. One, of course, Sirhan Sirhan was one, and Charlie Manson is another one. He started to catalogue all these people, so he started to do the real concrete research; he was a great add to that Unit.

There was a bunch that came in later. Some that were good and some that were not so good. But to answer the question, in the beginning of this, there was nothing in the literature. But what happened with Teten and I, when we were teaching criminal psychology, we soon came to the conclusion, and it might sound very simple, but it's true, that people kill the way in which they live. It sounds so simple, people kill the way in which they live.

We had a case up in Santa Barbara, California, a waitress, that was brutally beaten. She was thrown into a ditch probably less than two blocks from where the hobos used to live up there right off the railroad tracks, but brutally beaten around the head. This thing was regarded by the Santa Barbara Police Department, Al Tremblay, the Chief, brought it to us as a serial sex crime. We got to looking at this thing and we kept saying there's something missing, there's something missing. The gal had a button down blouse on, but every single one of those buttons were opened very slowly, very methodically. There was no ripping, there was no tearing, there was nothing. The bra...the exact same way, was not torn off or anything like that. Nipples were missing. The method of killing was she, her head was completely bashed in with a stone so that was really the method of killing.

But then you had the total exploration of the body where you had a stick shoved up into the vaginal area. So when Howard and I looked at this we are thinking to ourselves, this isn't some ferocious sex crime guy; there was no semen on the scene, okay. There was no penetration of her from either frontal or back, no penetration, no semen. But everything was done very methodically, and we always talked about the simple schizophrenic who has basically little or no contact with females, but is intrigued by them. And the simple schizophrenic often times can act in a world like a five year old. They can be physically strong and everything like that and we used to liken as much to the five year old taking a doll apart, and that's what we saw in that particular crime scene.

PM: So we had crime scenes very typical to that. We had one down in Virginia, I think it was Henrico County, where a young girl was grabbed at a bus station and a bottle was shoved up into her vaginal area. Strangulation was the cause of death, but nothing else, and it was once again a typical kind of case like that. And that's where we kept coming back and we kept separating out the killings of clear psychopaths who maybe put cigarette burns or something like that. And then we came up with the notion that people kill the way in which they live. So, when we would get a case to review, we'd sit down and we'd look at the crime scene pictures, we looked at the write-ups, we looked at the autopsy reports, we looked at all the forensic information, and we would come up with an evaluation...hey is this a torture type case...is it a sex case...what kind of case it is, and that would steer us into the kind of person we were looking for.

Were we always right? Not really, but we were right a hell of lot of the time because what we could then do is go back to the investigator and say, 'okay, let's take a look at who you've interviewed.' A lot of the times we found out that in most of these police packages that they had in their jacket somewhere, they got the person in the beginning but let him go, for whatever reason, they let him go. Just didn't have enough to continue with it. We went back and we wouldn't necessarily say this is the person.

Now, in the Meyerhoffer case we said this is the person. We were that convinced. Even when Pete [Dunbar] would come back and say, "God, we were picking on this guy." They even had a psychiatrist defend Meyerhoffer. We said ignore him because this is the guy, and it ultimately turned out to be him. So, we were kind of writing the book as it was going along.

As a matter of fact, even today you can get, whether it's Bob Ressler's book, whether it's the things I put together here, you can get books comparing the compiling of a lot of stories, but there's really no book on how to. And often times, the real reason for that is the truth of it is, psychological profiling is a combination of basic training in psychology and gut instinct, and the person's experience.

So, if you get a detective out there that's got fantastic training or education in let's say the behavioral end of things, but then there's also a tremendous amount of experience, but he, also she, has fantastic instincts, being able to sit down and sense and read and listen and pull together things; that's your best profiler.

PM: And then there's some people that are on television today, one of them claims to be a profiler and she went to one In-Service, and you know it's almost disgraceful as what they're saying. But, other ones are very, very good at what they're doing, and I think Bob Ressler is an excellent one. In Teten's day and my day, we never had what's on television today; but it's hard to get a good profiler. Police Departments will have them. The profiler is the guy who's going to solve the case all the time? Absolutely not. You're steering in a totally wrong direction, but if you're up against a blank, the biggest thing is to try. You now come up with new avenues to go into.

I've always said profilers never solve cases. Good detectives solve cases, and good Agents solve cases. It's like in the Pete Dunbar case, if it wasn't for Pete and if it wasn't for the mother of that victim, that case wouldn't have been solved by Pete and myself. It was good fortune. You know, the guy, the farmer who gets his telephone bill and all of a sudden we all have a wake-up call. Hey, we do got a guy from here; it comes a lot of times from good luck.

MO: What percentage of the cases would you say you were able to say this is positively the guy?

PM: A very, very small percentage where you would say, this is...

MO: 50%?

PM: I'd say 15% and less would you be able to say, "this is the guy." Now that's profiling homicide. Now, to separate out and, often times they don't separate out, but if you're profiling in a hostage negotiating case, so you got the case evolving right in front of you, you're not doing what's typical as a profiler who all of a sudden shows up eight months after the case has gone cold, and you gotta resurrect the case. But when you get out there and you're doing the profiling to motivate behavior, that's different than criminal profiling in the case.

MO: So, profiler has two important factors; experience or training.

PM: Absolutely; exactly.

MO: Gut instinct. You could have one or the other.

PM: So, if you have a dull sense of intuition you could get hit between the eyes and not realize what's going on, you're going to be useless as a profiler. I think it had a lot to do with the sensitivity of the, or the degree of sensitivity a person has in reading people.

MO: Just like a poker player.

PM: That's just like the poker player...yes.

MO: Did it have any effect on you going through these cases and having to read all this stuff psychologically?

PM: Fortunately, I didn't do with what I think some of the guys did. When I was involved in this, Headquarters kind of bailed me out because I was being dragged into a lot of cases at Headquarters, Division Six. They would ask for my input. So, unlike some of the guys, like _____ when he was at the Academy. He got thrown I guess into the Atlanta case and the kidnappings that were going on down there and the murders. But, I think if you do this stuff full-time, it can really deaden you, if you're not careful. But, I could never say that I had negative effects happen on me because I had too many things going on; too many good things were happening.

You'd come back after a Khaddafi Muslim case, and you're worn out. You obviously are, but all of a sudden in your mind you're able to say 'damn.' I had a job where I was able to go up there and do something, and you don't say it's because you're like another God or something like that, but you just say it's an opportunity to contribute something that's really good.

I'd go on more on the success end of it and the positive end of it. Like this one here, Susan's kidnapping one, I talked to the mother as recently as two years ago. It has a lot of television exposure on that particular case, and it's a case that there's no doubt, if Teten and I didn't get involved in that case, Pete Dunbar would still have this as an unsolved case, and we got lucky. I mean you gotta put all the things together.

MO: The stars have to line up.

PM: Exactly, and sometimes you make your own luck. Would he...or I can tell you clearly...would Pete Dunbar have come up with the idea of putting telephone coverage on the family a year to the day from the anniversary of the killing? Probably not. And, if Pete Dunbar was not as good an Agent, he probably would have not had you suggest it to him. He probably would have said, hey forget about it, the case is over, but he kept that open, and he was a good Agent. Pete was one of the best Agents that I've run into; a real old time Agent.

But, I never, of course my personality is not such that I deal with the negative that happens in life. I contrasted with one agent who made a big production about how it wrecked his life and then he almost died in a hotel...

MO: That's stress related type...correct?

PM: Yeah, but it could have been perfectly naturally related as well. He claims it was stress related, but I mean it's hard for me to imagine that you could get yourself that stressful without just saying, screw this, I'm getting the hell away from this. He likened it to the fact that he almost went into a trance or whatever it was and it really totally effected...

Whereas you get a guy like Bob Ressler. Bob lived a well-rounded life, and Bob saw ten times as much as ever saw. As a matter of fact, most of what put his career on, was stuff that Ressler handed to him. And the working relationship with them was not nearly as good as it was with Howard Teten and myself or Ressler and myself. I think it more speaks to his shortcomings.

Clearly, you can do this kind of work but you have to keep a balance. As a matter of fact, there was a detective on one of the cases we reviewed, and he had a psychiatrist write-up on the case. And it was a case that was down in Louisiana. They found this gal murdered and they found her after like three weeks and her body had blown up and everything; it was a God awful scene. That was one case where the psychiatrist...

The other one was the case of a couple that allowed a little child to die, and the child's mother never gave her any love; never given any nutrition or anything like that, and she actually literally died in a crib. Okay, and the baby was like three years old, but had the body of maybe a six month old. They used to punish the child, because in the room was a well-kept rabbit, the cage was perfectly clean and everything. In the meantime, in the crib it was full of feces and everything. But they would take a paring knife and they would do a 360 on the finger of the little girl, the baby, to shut it up from squealing. Now it squealed because the only thing in its environment was a rabbit who squealed, cause the little kid never learned how to talk or anything like that.

And when the detectives went in to investigate it, it was so repulsive they had to send these guys to treatment. But the psychiatrist, and I often used to use the expression, I might even still, I think I have it here in the book, but his premise was, that every one of these that we see, there are of hundreds of Dr. deBakeys out there curing people who otherwise would not make it.

In other words, what he was trying to do was give them the balance of the bell shaped curve ...there are a lot of terrible people down here, but if you stay down here with the terribles, you're gonna get your head screwed up, but you gotta realize there's an awfully lot of Sunday school picnics going on there, a lot of doctors who are doing fantastic research, and a lot of good people who are out there.

PM: And I always kept that in my mind because I thought it was the greatest single piece of advice that you could give to a detective. From your time in law enforcement and from my time in law enforcement, detectives who are limited to investigating homicides can become some of the most cynical people and the most hardened people that anybody can ever experience. Some of the most mistrustful people, their marriage success is generally the pits. A lot of times, and a guy who was in my wedding party was that way, Gene McDermott, is now passed away and dead and everything like that. Gene kept everything in. He was tough and you couldn't break that exterior. He took it out on his family; he took it out on his wife; they divorced and everything; he had one kid jump off the roof. I'm still in touch with the oldest daughter, but it teaches you a lesson in life that if you don't have the balance, I don't care what you are. You know, you can be a dentist, you can be a butcher, you could be whatever. It doesn't necessarily mean that because you're an FBI Agent or police detective or you're a profiler handling some of this crap and constantly reviewing ugly stuff, but you can have a balanced life. And if you feel it's taking you off balance, that's time to just close the books and get the hell away from it.

MO: So, your best advice is to lead a balanced life?

PM: Totally, yes. We find that if you're losing your balance in doing this stuff, get away from it because two things are going to happen. It will personally affect you; and you'll become ineffective because you'll be too emotional in doing it. And, I'll never forget Teten, the first time I saw this slide he had and he used to use it in the police department. He showed the sea-saw, when emotions go up, reason goes down, reason goes up, emotion goes down. When I first saw that slide, I said it was the stupidest slide I had ever seen in my life, but the fact is that what are we talking...30 years later...I'm saying to you I still remember that slide; it made a lot of sense.

MO: He knew...adjusted good thinking.

PM: Exactly.

MO: You mentioned your friend how he didn't let things out, but he really did when he went home and he took it out on the wife and the family.

PM: Yeah, but that's the wrong way of letting it out.

MO: Yeah, yeah.

PM: It's not a productive thing to let it out in a negative way. That's the equivalent of letting it out by going to a local bar and pounding drinks until you knock yourself out at night. You sit and instead of pounding the drinks you're pounding your family. You know, emotionally, so it's a tough thing.

MO: Let me bring you back to the hostage thing. You said you developed that back in Quantico also, and what was the source of information you used to initially look into that. Is there a book to look at for that?

PM: There was no book on that either. The source of information on that, really the one that I'll have to give the best credits to is the New York City Police Department. Now, did they structure it the way we ultimately structured it? No. They brought us in, meaning Teten and myself, to teach a behavioral block. Our feelings all along, on hostage negotiation, that if you're going to be successful in redirecting behavior, you better know what the behavior is all about. So, we used much more of a behavioral model. It was very similar to our criminal psychology, but we clearly laid out, and what was interesting, the types of people that are most likely to take a hostage.

The most common one was the common ordinary criminal who basically probably was very psychopathic or sociopathic. And they'll wheel and deal with you; they don't want to get killed. And we put the whole pendulum out there; the bell shaped curve. And what you get in those days, we had way down here in the end with the religious fanatic and that's what you're seeing today.

And we basically admitted in those days that it really is virtually impossible to negotiate with them. The interesting thing which I think is a complete change in the case of terrorism, is that all of a sudden now our troops are being confronted by people who don't give you any room to negotiate. You could go down to the jungles with the ELNs, they'll negotiate...for what? For money, and because they want to stay in business, they're gonna make sure your kidnap victims survive. But what you've got going on in the Middle East is totally the opposite, and they're not looking to make use of the survivor or make them survive or whatever. I mean it's like nothing...you can't do anything, short of killing them before they kill you.

PM: And see that's the dilemma, but we used to go over the entire block of behavior. You get a paranoid guy, totally paranoid, and he's talking about wacko things that are not based on reality. Well, then that's the kind of behavior, the only way to redirect it is by maybe doing something to his environment to change him, turn off the lights, but you had to be very careful. You couldn't come and say well in all situations put the heat up, turn the lights out, disorient them that way. You had to be careful that the very thing that you did with his exterior environment wasn't the thing that would ignite him.

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MO: Set him off?

PM: Exactly.

MO: Wasn't that when you were in DC with the hostage situation?

PM: Oh yeah.

MO: With the mayonnaise; wasn't that sort of a hostage situation?

PM: You got them away from the big decision that was in this guy's mind to make him make small decisions.

MO: I mean it's incredible that mayonnaise becomes the primary thing for this guy as opposed to...

PM: And he gets then involved how to send the sandwiches up.

MO: Such an interesting observation.

PM: Yeah. You see that was the thing that we tried with Kiritsis, the cooking of the Greek food, and I used his family to cook the food, but it didn't work.

MO: What about using his music and really aggravating him like they did in Waco?

PM: Those things can be very effective. Yeah, but you gotta be very astute figuring out, is it having a positive effect towards your end, or is it having a detrimental effect towards the victim's end? And that's a delicate balance. You can do things that can really screw up your case, like for example, when I talked about the military ordinance guy who went on television and he's talking about how he's going to penetrate the wall to get into this guy's apartment. Well, someone might say well that would be a good technique to use to scare the guy to open the door. Not with this guy it wasn't. He'd say okay good, you try and penetrate the wall and you're gonna see what's gonna hit you.

MO: Did you sort of foresee this SWAT team/negotiator conflict that we had in Waco?

PM: To be honest with you, no. I wasn't that close enough to...

MO: No, not that particular case, but that it would be a problem at some point when you're developing these negotiator ideas?

PM: You're absolutely right. We talked about that in the early days, that that happens in all cases, and it does happen in all cases. See because the SWAT guy is more - control the situation, control your perimeter, the SWAT guy is impatient you know to really get the job done. More than that, okay, where they're wanting to get it on with, and the negotiator is saying to himself, time is limitless. In other words, don't pressure me. It could take...and that happens an awful lot.

I'm trying to think of the SWAT guy's name who was in Quantico at the time who had just taken over and he was head of the SWAT. But he kind of scared me during Hadaffi because he actually gave me the feeling that he wanted to propel off the roof and go into the windows. In other words, he was telling me it was realistic to do.

MO: Is that the one?

PM: No, no. It was before him, and I can see him, but his name I think it began with a "B." But his name skips my mind.

MO: So, here's this natural conflict between the two. And you saw this when you were putting together the hostage negotiation thing. Your understanding that this is gonna be a problem in the future.

PM: Yeah, yeah. Well, what I always used to teach, and it something that happens in kidnappings too. When you're a hostage negotiator, you gotta keep as much attention onto who's administering this action that the police have taken or the FBI has taken; in other words, who's your command? Then you gotta keep your eye on the Swatters, and then you gotta keep your eye on yourself, and then the last one you gotta keep your eye on is the person you're negotiating with.

And, I've seen more cases where the SAC or the person in charge of a crisis can cause a much bigger crisis, then let's say even the perpetrator does.

MO: Trying to rush you?

PM: Exactly.

MO: They've lost control.

PM: And that can happen and it can clearly happen. If you have a command level that is patient and willing to let something take as much time, and the pressures at Waco had to be immense because you clearly had a guy there that was back and forth, back and forth, back and forth. You clearly had a guy who was very psychopathic in his dealing with people. He'd tell you what you wanted to hear.

I think the negotiators did a real fine job, but it got to the point where one of the things you've gotta measure is what's taking place with the victims. And if you see this disintegration there, which they firmly believed they were seeing. I believed that they were seeing it, there is the possibility you come to take point where I told you about earlier, you don't have to be so religiously hell-bent, but if you've got yourself so convinced on this is the way that God has planned your world to end in a blaze of glory, you're up against a guy who may as well just be like the bomb carrier over in Iraq. Because that's the way in which they program it to go out. And I think that's what they came up against.

MO: So it was a classic case of everything ...the problem with the SWAT Team and the negotiators and the problem with the religious fanatic you mentioned on the other side of the bell curve, that you can't negotiate with.

PM: Yeah, they collide.

MO: And, so it's almost an impossible situation to win.

PM: To get movement...yeah, and then that's clearly what happened. And then it comes to a point where whoever is the guy in charge of the decision, and where the negotiator has gotta be real careful, the negotiator has gotta be real careful that he doesn't get too wrapped up emotionally in the situation himself, to then second guess what comes down as a decision that we're gonna make a move, and then become critical of whoever makes the decision to make a move. Do you get what I'm saying?

MO: This is some type of Stockholm Syndrome that could affect the negotiator?

PM: Right, yeah. Well, there's no question about it because, I'll give you a small example. When I did the Kiritsis case, okay, it's not that you get close to the subject in a case, you don't get close. You get to kind of understanding the dynamics and how they're screwed up in the head and everything. But I think what really motivates you, is you don't want to see anybody killed. Okay?

PM: And I think what might have happened a little bit at Waco because it was such a tragedy, that the negotiators got really, really close to this thing, they got emotionally involved. You're bound to get emotionally involved; you've gotta be like ice if you don't. And then when something really bad happens, like the place burns down and kids get burned, people get killed and everything, that really registers very heavy on the negotiator.

In the Kiritsis case, when I took Dick Hall, the victim into the next bedroom and put him on the bed, then I heard the shot go off. What had transpired was he had untied, with the wire he had on the shotgun, the sawed-off shotgun, threw Hall in my direction, I took him out. But unbeknownst to me, he then turned to the Chief and he says to the Chief, you don't know how much I've been wanting to shoot this Goddam fucking shotgun for the last three days! He goes out through a sliding glass door where the Swatters were, I'm amazed that the Indianapolis Police SWAT Team didn't whack this guy, which could have been a problem, they could have been shooting in, and he lets him go. So, I'm in the bedroom and I hear "ba boom," and I figured for sure this guy is history, he's dead. So, in comes one of the Agents from Indianapolis, and I can see his name, he's the guy who handled the hijacking in Alexandria, Mullen was his name, John Mullen. John comes in and I said to him, "Where's Kyritsis?" And Mullen said, "He's gone."

So gone...Yes, he's up in the sky. Gone, I said is he shot? And he said, no, he's gone. So what he was trying to tell me is that he's cuffed and down in the car but I thought and so then finally I said to him, "Did they have to shoot him?" And, I'm sure John said to himself, "why are you worried about that?" But in a way, I thought about the dynamics of that afterwards and I actually would have felt that had he been shot, cause I knew the position we had him in, that he was getting ready to give it all up, and had he been shot that probably would have been a sense of disappointment to know that he was shot. Even though he was the bad guy.

MO: Yeah.

PM: And there is that thing, that's why one of the most critical things when guys are involved, even Swatters involved in this, that a lot of these guys need debriefing afterwards. Just to talk about it; just to get it off their chest, and we used to do that fairly well in Quantico. I think they do it even more so now because the negotiators are not left alone; they have a team, they've either got one or two guys, whereas in my days, you were out there. We went under the concept that it was one negotiator, although when the Kaddafi Muslims came down, I structured it differently because I called in the CIA psychiatrist and the State Department psychiatrist because I had been used to working with those guys. I called them in for advice, and they became part of the negotiating strategy team, if you would.

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PM: And it worked out perfectly.

MO: I think you had one other section you were going to talk about victims. Was that on your list, victims?

PM: No.

MO: Let me just finish off by saying that how would you summarize your FBI Bureau career and how you felt about it?

PM: You know, without sounding corny, I look upon the career I had in the FBI as being one of the most fortunate things that I have ever had happen to me because of the fact I came into the Bureau having been a school teacher in a religious Order in New York. And coincidentally actually meeting some of my students who I had taught in an earlier phase of life. But then having the opportunity to do some of the things that I had. And I think if you look at the word 'self-fulfillment,' I had a tremendous opportunity of self-fulfillment. And I look back upon my little better than 20 years in the FBI as having taken advantage of everything that was given to me to do and to be able to do it well and leave a legacy.

Maybe I'm kidding myself, but I genuinely feel that I left legacy behind. I generally feel that the guys that I worked with, the guys that worked for me and the guys that I worked for, we left as great friends, and I couldn't be more positive. If somebody were to say to me today, Pat, would you do it all over? And, I'd say, in a heartbeat, to do it the way in which it came about when I was there. I met great people, great friends, still attached to them, and couldn't have been better. I just feel sorry for the guy who has a shoe shop somewhere and puts heels on shoes for twenty years and what can you have to say about it. And when you can look back and say that a couple of things either you directly did yourself or you taught others to do, made a contribution in some way to society without aggrandizing yourself, what could make you more happy in life, and that's I think the way I look back on it. Interesting times.

MO: Great job!! So, that's about it unless you want to add anything. We've covered about everything?

PM: We've covered it.

MO: Well, I could be here for days talking to you; it's really interesting. Thank you.

PM: If there's anything you need out of here, I'd be more than happy to...

MO: Would you mind if I copied that?

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PM: Here it is...I think this is on a CD. You want me to give it to you?

MO: Yeah, yeah, if you don't mind.

PM: Let me call the computer on. And if it doesn't work, here, you got it.

MO: Oh, good, okay. That's good.